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C H A P T E R 7 
SHUN-TI A N D T H E END OF Y U A N RULE 
IN CHINA 
Y U A N C H I N A A T T H E A C C E S S I O N O F T O G H O N T E M U R 
( S H U N - T l ) 
When Toghdn Temiir, barely thirteen years of age, was brought to the 
summer capital, Shang-tu, and installed there as the tenth emperor of the 
Yuan dynasty in July 1 333 , the realm he nominally headed had long been 
under stress, owing in part to complex, endemic tensions among its ruling 
elites and in part to troubles of long standing in China itself Although there 
was no sign of imminent collapse, it is still a little ironic that of all the Yuan 
emperors, it was his reign, the last in China, that turned out to be the 
longest. It is not so ironic that as passive a ruler as he turned out to be, the 
whole quality of political life during his reign came to constitute a powerful 
negative example to the builders of the next dynasty, the Ming. Toghdn 
Temiir (often referred to by his temple name, Shun-ti) reigned in China, or at 
least Ta-tu, until 1368. 1 He died in Mongolia in 1370. The history of his 
reign raises the grand question, Why did the Yuan dynasty fall as and when 
it did? To that question there appears to be no simple answer. There was 
certainly no lack of energetic effort on the part of Mongols and Chinese alike 
to save it. 
The younger emperor inherited a system of government whose size, com-
plexity, and costliness stemmed both from its need to provide offices and 
employment for a large minortiy population of privileged Mongols and 
foreigners and from the fact that although the state was mainly a public 
bureaucracy, it was in part also the private patrimony of the imperial house 
and of certain high-ranking elites. A short description of these special fea-
tures, as they had evolved by 1 333 , will serve to give some background to 
the march of events during Toghdn Temiir's troubled reign. 
There was not one imperial capital, but two. The principal capital was Ta-tu 
(on the site of modern Peking), and the summer capital was Shang-tu, some 
1 Toghon Temiir was given the posthumous name Shun-ti by the Ming court. For a brief biography, see 
Herbert Franke, "Toghon Temiir," in the Dictionary of Ming biography, ed. L. Carrington Goodrich and 
Chaoying Fang (New York, 1976), pp. 1289-93 . 
5 6 1 
5 6 2 S H U N - T I A N D T H E E N D O F Y U A N R U L E I N C H I N A 
two hundred miles north in the steppes of Inner Mongolia. Toghon Temiir 
was enthroned in July 1 3 3 3 in Shang-tu and returned to Ta-tu in September 
or October. Subsequently he faithfully removed his court to Shang-tu every 
summer, as a remnant of the nomadic life-style of his forebears. Each year, 
until the destruction of Shang-tu by Chinese rebels in January 1359 put an 
end to the custom, in the fourth lunar month Toghon Temiir moved north 
and in the eighth returned to Ta-tu. The trip north was time-consuming: In 
1347 it took twenty-three days.2 Thus the emperor spent about a month and 
a half on the move each year, traveling at the leisurely pace of about ten miles 
per day. Each year he took with him a large retinue of officials, who worked 
from "branch" offices in Shang-tu during the summer months. These annual 
circuits were accomplished at a cost no one has yet tried to calculate, and they 
involved a great array of logistical support systems, transport and courier 
services, and a host of special traveling agencies. In the 1330s and 1340s, 
two southern Chinese literati-officials, Huang Chin and H u Chu, wrote 
enthusiastic, poetic descriptions of these scenic journeys and of the summer 
capital. Hu Chu's, the earlier such description, elicited a great deal of 
favorable comment.3 
The main capital, too, impressed the literati from south China, and it is to 
them we owe several late descriptions and accounts, ranging from the young 
Hu Chu's awed reactions to its magnificence and opulence set amid a large 
population of very poor people (it was an expensive place to live), to T'ao 
Tsung-i's detailed notes on it, and to Hsiao Hsiin's careful inventory, written 
in 1368, just before the new Ming government deliberately demolished the 
city.^ The outer walls measured 28.6 kilometers around. The walled imperial 
compound toward the city's southern edge, with its central court, palaces, 
and lake, took up approximately a twelfth of the entire intramural urban area 
(see Map 33). 
That the Yuan regime still encompassed a patrimonial dimension is evi-
dent in the existence of what amounted to a sort of semipublic, superficially 
bureaucratized business empire with holdings in such fields as farming, 
palace and temple construction, and manufacturing. Manufacturing took in 
everything from the procurement of raw materials to the shipment, storage, 
and distribution of an astounding range of items, mainly luxury goods. Some 
three hundred workshops and other enterprises, mostly in north China, drew 
on a labor pool of registered hereditary artisan households to turn out fabrics 
of all kinds, foodstuffs, beverages, jewelry, carriages, ironware, felt, tiles, 
2 Huang Chin ( 1 2 7 7 - 1 3 5 7 ) , Huang Wen-hsien chi (TSCC ed.), 7, pp. 7 i b - 7 2 b . 
3 Hu Chu ( 1276-ca . 1353), Ch'un-pai chat lei kao (TSCC ed.), 2 , pp. 5a ff. 
4 Hou Jen-chih and Chin T'ao, Pei-ching shih hua (Shanghai, 1980), pp. 6 1 - 9 5 . 
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leather goods, and much more.5 Their output was consumed directly by the 
jpper echelons of the conquest elite; some of it was also put on sale in the 
stores of the capital. The owners of these businesses were the members of the 
imperial family, their consorts, and the highest court officials; but the em-
peror could and did reassign these assets, and political overturn at the top 
ensured their periodic confiscation and redistribution. 
Counting patrimonial as well as civilian and military posts and their 
authorized support staff, the Yuan bureaucracy numbered some 33,000 at 
the beginning of Toghon Temiir's reign. It was a multinational body, as 
roughly 30 percent of all positions were occupied by non-Chinese. Statutory 
specifications reserved certain positions for members of one or another ethnic 
group, but these specifications were often quietly circumvented and on occa-
sion were openly disregarded or revised. 
Most government offices regularly employed a mixture of people of differ-
ent ethnic origins, and modes of accommodation had to be worked out in 
order that the work of government might proceed smoothly.6 Official proce-
dure required uneasy compromises between the Chinese sense of hierarchy 
and personal authority and responsibility and the Mongol conciliar tradition. 
Functions of state were performed in at least four written languages: standard 
literary Chinese; a strangely colloquialized chancery Chinese; Mongolian; and 
to judge from the regular assignment of "Muslim" (Hui-hui) clerks to impor-
tant government bodies, probably also Persian.7 Translators and interpreters 
were regular employees of bureaucratic agencies. 
It all worked better than one might suppose. Deliberate efforts were 
constantly made to foster ethnic cohesion in officialdom in the only way that 
it could be done: by encouraging loyalities to specific institutions. For exam-
ple, late in the Yuan, a large number of stone inscriptions {ft ming chi) were 
carved and displayed to advertise the duties and the signal importance of 
various government agencies, high and low, and to list the names of all the 
current incumbents of their offices, thus to build a sense of common purpose 
among all the different kinds of people who held the positions. There still 
remains a complete history of one Yuan office, the Directorate of the Palace 
Library, which was compiled as late as the 1360s, and it shows how persistent 
a sense of institutional identity could be for the Chinese, Mongols, Muslims, 
and other ethnic elements that made up its large staff.8 Politically the most 
5 Li Kan, Yuan tai she hut ching chi shih kao (Wuhan, 1985), pp. 229—43 (tables); and Oshima Ritsuko, 
"The chiang-hu in the Yuan," Acta Asiatica, 45 (1983), pp. 69—95. 
6 Elizabeth Endicott-West, "Imperial governance in Yuan times," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 46, 
(1986), pp. 523—49, touches on this problem. 
7 Huang Shijian, "The Persian language in China during the Yuan dynasty," Papers on Far Eastern History, 
34 (1986), pp. 8 3 - 9 5 . 
8 Wang Shih-tien (fl. 14th c.), ed., Pi shu chien chih (SKCS ed.). 
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important manifestation of interethnic institutional cohesion in Toghon 
Temiirs reign was to be found in the Censorate, whose members insisted on 
their right of remonstrance and who therefore played a pivotal role in high-
level political processes right to the end of the Yuan dynasty. 
Foreign participation in government helped bloat its size. To take one 
example, the high court of justice, whose jurisdiction was limited to cases 
involving Mongols or aliens in the two capitals, employed a staff of ninety-
six, headed by forty-two Mongolian judges (jarghuchi), each of whom held 
the very high civil service rank of i B and enjoyed the accompanying high 
salary and perquisites.9 The problem of overstaffing (jung kuan) was voiced 
occasionally at court in Toghon Temiir's time, but for political reasons the 
Yuan ascendancy was never able to go too far for too long in cutting supernu-
merary positions, despite the shortages of revenue. 
There were several recruitment paths for the bureaucracy in the late Yuan. 
Most lower officials served an apprenticeship as clerks or Confucian school-
teachers. Young members of the conquest elite (and some Chinese) were first 
groomed and informally scrutinized as kesigden, hereditary guards or house-
men to the monarch and his family. The descendants of three warriors who 
had been Chinggis Khan's closest comrades headed this corps, which came to 
number some thirteen thousand young men, and it has been characterized as 
a "cradle of officialdom" and the "citadel of the Yuan ruling class." 10 The 
kesigden enjoyed what was known in Chinese as ken chiao, literally, "roots and 
feet," an invidious reference to their having an aristocratic leg up on everyone 
else. 
The triennial Confucian examination system, instituted in 1 3 1 5 , was 
statistically a minor port of entry into the lower bureaucracy (there was a 
total of only some 550 chin shih degree holders by 1 3 3 3 , at most 2 percent of 
the officials), but as a matter of politics it was crucial. The system was 
heavily weighted in favor of Mongols (a small pool of candidates and an easy 
examination) and against southern Chinese (a huge pool of candidates and a 
demanding examination), yet despite these statutory inequalities, the system 
did create a common outlook and interethnic cohesion among the degree 
holders. 
The examination round of 1 333 , which had begun in the spring, ended with 
the final palace examination in the ninth lunar month of that year, shortly after 
the young emperor's return to Ta-tu from Shang-tu.11 This was the first 
examination under the Yuan to produce its full quota for all ethnic groups, 
9 Sung Lien et al., eds., Yiian shih (Peking, 1976), 87, pp. 2 1 8 7 - 8 (hereafter cited as YS). 
10 Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, The military establishment of the Yuan dynasty (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), pp. 39—44; 
see also his Yiian tai shih hsin t'an (Taipei, 1983), pp. 1 4 1 - 2 3 0 . 
1 1 Sung Chiung ( 1 2 9 4 - 1 3 4 6 ) , Yen-shih chi (SKCS ed.), 1 5 , p. 13a. 
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clear evidence of growing interest in the examinations and the spread of higher 
education. The graduation list from that year is still extant. 12 It shows, among 
other things, that the fifty Chinese were, as a group, a bit older than the fifty 
non-Chinese, with median ages (sui) of thirty-one and twenty-eight, respec-
tively. It also shows that 92 percent of the Chinese were married, as against 
only 74 percent for the others. Interestingly, the Mongols and members of 
other minorities were heavily intermarried with Chinese: In all, 58 percent of 
them had Chinese mothers, and of those married, nearly 70 percent had 
Chinese wives. Everyone, irrespective of ethnic origin, tended to receive simi-
lar kinds of first appointments as local officials. The second name on the non-
Chinese list is Yii Ch'iieh, a Tangut of undistinguished ancestry from Honan 
Province and, in that sense, typical of the obscure, non-Chinese youth for 
whom the examinations were the likeliest road to fame and fortune. Y i i Ch'iieh 
will be met later as an outstanding local official and reformer. He also became a 
talented poet and litterateur in Chinese; his works still survive. 
The chin-sbih class list of 1 3 3 3 thus captures for a certain moment in time 
some of the intricate cleavages and blendings that characterized the Yuan 
ascendancy: institutionalized ethnic preference alongside widespread inter-
marriage; a conquest society well on the way to assimilating some of the 
moral values and literary and administrative traditions of its colonial inferi-
ors; and a Chinese elite that had come actively and fully to participate in the 
foreign dynasty that ruled them. 
Yuan government in 1 3 3 3 still weighed unevenly on the two principal 
regions of China, the north and the south. Especially striking was the mainte-
nance of so dense a network of local administrative units in north China, a 
region that had borne the brunt of the wars of the Mongol conquest and had 
then suffered further depopulation by continual emigration to the south or to 
the cities, repeatedly visited as it was by floods, earthquakes, droughts, 
locust infestations, epidemics, and famine. 14 Yang Wei-chen did not exagger-
ate when stating (in 1348) that the population of an entire northern county 
(hsien) was often smaller than that of a single southern Chinese lineage (tsu).15 
South China, much richer and more heavily settled, was, as a matter of 
deliberate policy, more lightly administered. In proportion to its population, 
its local government officials were only one-fifth as numerous as those in the 
north, and its population paid nothing approaching the north's rates of 
1 2 Fully annotated in Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, "Yiian-t'ung yuan nien chin shih lu chiao chu," Shih huo yueh 
k'an, 1 3 (1983), PP- 7 2 - 9 0 » 1 4 7 - 6 2 . 
1 3 Yii Ch'iieh (1303—58), Ch'ing-yang hsien sheng wen chi (SPTK ed.). 
14 Contemporary references to these conditions are quoted in Aritaka Iwao, "Gendai no nomin seikatsu ni 
tsuite," in Kuwabara Hakushi kanreki kinen Toyoshi ronso (Kyoto, 1934), pp. 979 ff.; and Wu Han, "Yuan 
ti kuo chih peng k'uei yii Ming chih chien kuo," Ch'ing-hua hsiieh pao, 1 1 (1936), pp. 359—423. 
1 5 Yang Wei-chen ( 1 2 9 6 - 1 3 7 0 ) , Tung-wei-tzu wen chi (SPTK ed.), 4, pp. 9b~iob. 
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taxation. By way of tacit compensation for this disparity, the northern Chi-
nese were officially favored over the southern, especially in the matter of 
eligibility for bureaucratic positions. 
Finally, in 1 3 3 3 , the Yuan dynasty was funding itself from a wide variety 
of sources. Besides taxes on land and commerce, there were state cash invest-
ments in many commercial enterprises, and outright state control of farms 
and especially of saltworks. By 1 3 3 3 , income from the national salt mo-
nopoly had steadily risen to provide a maximum of some 7.6 million ingots 
{ting; each nominally equivalent to 50 ounces of silver) in paper cash yearly, 
enough to meet about 80 percent of central revenue needs. A sea transport 
system moved vast quantities of grain from the Yangtze delta up to Ta-tu, 
where it fed the whole conquest establishment, plus the large numbers of 
poor people and dependents of all kinds who inhabited the city, and provided 
grain for the Mongolian people living in the steppes to the north. These vital 
shipments peaked in 1 329 . Soon thereafter the amounts began to slide, at 
first gradually (there was a 25 percent shortfall by 1 3 4 1 ) and then catastrophi-
cally. The Yiian dynasty had almost exhausted further possibilities for raising 
income and in fact would soon be caught between diminishing revenues and 
rising costs.16 
So much for a short tour d'horizon of late Yiian China at Toghon Temiir's 
accession, two decades before things began to fall apart. It is important to 
bear in mind how close all these events were to the age of Khubilai (r. 1260— 
94), even though eight emperors had come and gone in the meantime. 
Several senior officials in their sixties in 1 3 3 3 had come of age and begun 
their careers in the time of the dynasty's founder. Khubilai was still very 
much a living memory, as Bayan's chancellorship would show. 
T O G H O N T E M U R ' S E N T H R O N E M E N T A N D B A Y A N ' S 
C H A N C E L L O R S H I P , 1 3 3 3 - 1 3 4 0 
It is not absolutely certain who Toghon Temiir really was. In 1 340 , he 
officially and publicly asserted that he was indeed a legitimate descendant of 
Khubilai, in the sixth generation, the elder son of the assassinated emperor 
Khoshila (posthumous temple name, Ming-tsung; r. 1329) and a Qarluq 
(Turkish) consort. However, Tugh Temiir (posthumous temple name, Wen-
tsung; r. 1 328 , 1 3 2 9 - 3 2 ) had earlier issued an edict (drafted by Yi i Chi, one 
of the most respected and influential of the Chinese literati of his time) that 
16 The principal work on Yiian finance is still that by Herbert Franke, Geld und Wirtschaft in China unter 
der Mongolenherrschaft: Beitrdge zur Wirtshaftsgeschichte der Yiian-Zeit (Leipzig, 1949). See also Herbert F. 
Schurmann, Economic structure of the Yiian dynasty: Translation of chapters 93 and 94 of the Yiian shih 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1956; repr. 1967). 
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declared, apparently on the authority of the husband of ToghSn Temiir's wet 
nurse, that Toghon Temiir was not really Khoshila's son. 1 7 There was also a 
story, widely believed, that Toghon Temiir was actually the son of a Chinese 
father (a descendant of the Sung emperors) and a Muslim mother and that 
Khoshila had adopted him. 1 8 Accordingly, Toghon Temiir had been exiled at 
the age of ten to an island off the coast of Korea and, at the age of twelve, 
removed to what is now Kuei-lin in Kwangsi Province, where he reportedly 
spent the year before his recall and enthronement taking lessons from a 
Buddhist monk in the Analects and the Hsiao ching (Book of filial piety) and 
making friends with a troop of monkeys, symbols of his birth year ( 1320) . 
Upon Tugh Temiir (Wen-tsung)'s death in September 1 3 3 2 , Toghon 
Temiir was bypassed in favor of his younger half-brother Irinjibal, a child of 
six, but that child died in December 1 3 3 2 , after reigning for only two 
months. There followed an interregnum for the next seven months, during 
which time the kingmakers of Ta-tu maneuvered on behalf of their favorite 
candidates. The politically dominant clique, that of El Temiir and his kins-
men, backed the candidacy of Tugh Temiir's young heir, El TegQs. El Tegiis's 
mother, Budashiri, argued that El Tegiis was still too young and recom-
mended that he instead be made the heir apparent to Toghon Temiir. She 
eventually got her way, in part by allowing El Temiir to marry one of his 
daughters to Toghon Temiir, but most of all because she won the support of 
Bayan, a Mongol of the Merkid tribe, who was on the verge of becoming the 
dominant political personality of his time. He was already a senior official 
with concurrent leading positions in the Bureau of Military Affairs (or Privy 
Council, Shu mi yiian), various praetorian guard units, and inner-palace 
agencies. As a result of his assistance in securing Toghon Temiir's succession, 
in 1 3 3 3 Bayan finally obtained the highest civil appointment of all, the 
chancellorship of the right (grand councillor of the right, yu ch'eng hsiang). In 
1 3 3 5 , he became chancellor (ch'eng hsiang) pure and simple, a position that he 
held from 1 3 3 3 until his overthrow in 1 340 . 
Clearly, Toghon Temiir's intended role was that of a temporary figurehead. 
He was a thirteen-year-old child, untrained, still officially illegitimate, and 
easily disposable; indeed, he was advised to stay in the shadows and take no 
direct part in ruling the empire. He later stated, surely with some truth, that 
he had spent his early years as emperor in constant fear. It was a very shaky 
beginning for what turned out to be a long, if somewhat passive, reign. 
In the summer of 1 3 3 5 , Chancellor Bayan carried out a bloody coup 
17 John D. Langlois, J r . , "Yi i Chi and his Mongol sovereign: The scholar as apologist," Journal of Asian 
Studies, 3 8 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , p. 1 1 1 ; YS, 1 8 1 , p. 4 1 8 0 . 
18 The case in favor of this story has been pressed by Wan Ssu-t'ung ( 1638—1702) in Keng shen cbiin i shih, 
repr. in vol. 4 of Shih liao ts'ung pien (Taipei, 1968). 
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against the surviving members of the family of his former colleague El 
Temiir, all of whom he charged with treason. He then set in motion an 
extraordinary program of reaction, designed, as the Yuan shih (Official his-
tory of the Yiian) has it, to "impose the old regulations."19 Toghon Temiir's 
reign title (nien hao) was changed to Chih-yiian, exactly the same as the title 
Khubilai had used from 1264 to 1294. With all possible literalism, Bayan 
seized the calendar, turned its pages back to the era of the Yiian founding, 
and restarted it. What could that have possibly meant? Why did he do it? 
Bayan's personal experiences provide a few clues. He and his ancestors had 
been kesigden, hereditary housemen to the khaghan and his family. As a 
youth, Bayan had served as warrior-houseman to Prince Khaishan, and for 
bravery in action in the last of the steppe wars (1300—6), he was awarded the 
title ba'atur (valiant) at a traditional princely convention, or khuriltai. When 
Khaishan became emperor (posthumous temple name, Wu-tsung; r. 1307— 
11) , Bayan assumed a series of high central posts and military commands in 
China. After 1 3 1 1 , he served effectively in high-level provincial positions, 
during which time he donated large tracts of farmland (given to him by the 
emperor) to the kesig and to the Tibetan Buddhist hierarch who was chaplain 
to the Yiian court. In 1328 he had been a major power behind the succession 
of Khaishan's son Tugh Temiir (Wen-tsung). He was, as his biography says, 
"resolute, serious, intelligent, and decisive,"20 at least in his earlier years. All 
this appears to draw a portrait of an aristocrat of long and wide experience, 
with deep personal, ethnic, and institutional loyalties to the more specifically 
Mongolian side of that Sino-Mongolian hybrid, the Yiian dynasty. 
It is clear that Bayan believed that things had drifted in undesirable 
directions in the forty years since Khubilai's death and that he wanted to 
restore the status quo ante. But whatever that might mean, it was in no way 
clarified by the imperial edict that announced the readoption of the Chih-
yiian reign title. The edict spoke vaguely of portents of celestial warning. It 
said that although the realm was enjoying prosperity and peace, the astrolo-
gers had noted irregularities and that these called for improving government 
by way of reviving the old norms {chiu tien) that had worked so well under 
Khubilai.21 In other words, major and perhaps painful changes were prom-
ised, at a time when things were officially acknowledged to be fairly quiet in 
the realm. Because there was no general sense of crisis, because there was no 
broad spectrum of political and moral support for what he was trying to do, 
and because his program lacked clear definition, Bayan was soon obliged to 
use some very forceful means to impose his will. 
19 YS, 138, p. 3338. 
20 YS, 138, p. 3335. 
21 YS, 38, p. 830. 
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In all that follows, it is important to try to establish what Bayan himself 
had in mind and to distinguish that from what his many opponents, Chinese 
and non-Chinese alike, believed that he had in mind. 
There were two main parts to Bayan's reforms. One part, often overlooked, 
stemmed from his considerable administrative knowledge and experience in 
China, and it aimed at alleviating distress and improving the general welfare 
of the realm. Palace expenditures were cut (with the expenditure levels of 
Khubilai's era sometimes used as a target); the salt monopoly quotas were 
reduced; and conscientious and continuing efforts were made to provide 
timely and appropriate relief to areas throughout the country that had been 
stricken by famine and other disasters. So far, so good. 
It was the other part of his effort, the attempt to reestablish the ruling 
system as Bayan thought Khubilai had originally designed it, that in the end 
proved impossible to carry through. What this mainly entailed was reimpos-
ing in both the military and political spheres the sharp lines of ethnic 
separation that, in Bayan's view, constituted the absolute bedrock of Yiian 
rule in China. To attempt this amounted to putting half a century of history 
into reverse, and evidently Bayan had no idea at the outset just how difficult 
that would be. 
Cultural and social relationships among the Mongols, other foreigners, 
and the native Chinese elites of north and south had long obscured the once-
simple ethnic distinctions, which were now shot through with ambiguities 
and complex cross-shadings. Many ambitious Chinese had accommodated 
themselves to Mongol ways by adopting Mongolian names (a practice Bayan 
frowned upon), learning the Mongolian language, intermarrying, and, in a 
variety of ways, insinuating themselves into the Mongolian power structure. 
On the other side of the coin, many Mongols and other foreigners found 
China and the Chinese congenial. 
Take, for example, A-jung (d. ca. 1335) , a Mongol of the Kereyid tribe, a 
kesigdei to the same Khaishan whom Bayan had served, and a competent civil 
and military administrator — in short, someone to all appearances much like 
Bayan. But A-jung went culturally in a wholly different direction from Bayan: 
He liked gambling, hunting, and playing ball, and he was also a student of 
Chinese history and an admirer of south China's lush landscapes. He owned a 
Hunan retreat called the Plum Moon Estate where he planted several hundred 
plum trees22 and enjoyed his cultivated pleasures in the close company of 
Chinese literati. Bayan's reimposition of ethnic separatism had the effect of 
placing in doubt interethnic personal relationships such as these, as well as pa-
tronage and career expectations. Therefore, Bayan's plans had no appeal what-
22 Sung Chiung, Yen-shth chi, 8, pp. 1 3 a - ! 5 a ; YS, 143 , pp. 3 4 2 0 - 1 . 
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soever to A-jung (who mournfully predicted to Yii Chi that Bayan would soon 
abolish the Confucian examination system) or to the many others like him. At 
the elite level, foreigners and Chinese could no longer be cleanly separated. 
This was at the heart of the political troubles encountered by Bayan's program. 
Specifically, Bayan's reassertion of the foreign ascendancy in China cer-
tainly included the disarming of all Chinese (and Koreans) and the confisca-
tion of their horses. He forbade the Chinese henceforth from learning Mongo-
lian or foreign scripts, although the measure was soon rescinded, and he 
reserved a range of leading positions in the bureaucracy exclusively for the 
Mongols and foreigners in China. It may have been zealous local officials, 
rather than Bayan himself, who ordered the confiscation of all iron agricul-
tural tools and outlawed Chinese opera and storytelling. It was no part of 
Bayan's actual policies, but it was indeed indicative of the mass psychology of 
the time and the apprehension that his policies aroused among the Chinese, 
that the chancellor was widely believed to have ordered a nationwide 
roundup of all unmarried Chinese children and the extermination of all 
Chinese bearing the five most common surnames. 
One of Bayan's actual measures that provoked intense opposition at the 
elite level was his cancellation late in 1335 of the examination system. This 
measure affected all ethnic categories: northern Chinese, southern Chinese, 
Mongols, and other foreigners. In particular it dashed not only the career 
hopes of educated Chinese, but also those of many young Mongols and 
foreigners who lived in the provinces of China, without access to the kesig or 
to influential people in the capital. Much of their lives and energies had been 
focused on studious preparation for the examinations. What, then, was the 
point of abolishing the system and arousing their opposition? 
There is no simple answer. The decree canceling the examinations did not 
venture to offer a rationale. When challenged later, Bayan was unable to offer 
a satisfactory defense of the measure. Still, he stood firm, and the examina-
tions scheduled for 1336 and 1339 were never held. 
The most articulate proponent of abolishing the examinations was not 
Bayan, but Cherig Temiir of the Turkic Arghun tribe. Like Bayan, he had 
served in the kesig as a youth and had then had a distinguished career as a high-
level administrator and military commander. No extremist, Cherig Temiir was 
knowledgeable and competent and particularly experienced in handling fam-
ine relief. What distressed him about the examinations was the expense they 
entailed: He had witnessed the commandeering of state transport and the 
outlay of scarce resources to make the arrangements for the examinations at the 
provincial level. He also urged that the school subsidies earmarked for examina-
tion candidates be used instead to support the kesigden.23 
23 YS, 142, pp. 3403-6. 
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Yet the issue went much further than that; it was not solely a matter of 
reducing expenses and reallocating resources. Khubilai had never held exami-
nations. Since their institution in 1 3 1 5 , newly minted chin shih had enjoyed 
something of an unfair advantage in competing with young clerks and transla-
tors for entry-level positions in the regular bureaucracy, and they had, or 
were thought to have, better chances for subsequent promotion. Holding a 
degree was beginning to challenge service in the kesig for prestige. But a chin 
shih degree was no guarantee of administrative competence: Bayan himself 
and many others stood witness to that. Rather, abolishing the examinations 
was a way to underscore the value of aristocratic hereditary privilege and of 
demonstrated practical experience. In preparation for government service, 
the study of the Confucian canon, though certainly not proscribed, was 
relegated to a secondary position. 
So much for the reforms. Following aristocratic custom, after his rise to 
the chancellorship Bayan began to accumulate vast personal assets. Chinese 
sources hostile to Bayan are careful to list these in detail. He also came to 
hold a first-class princely fief and an awesome range of concurrent official 
positions over central and palace organs, capital guard units, and patrimonial 
business agencies. So crowded were the streets with officials when Bayan's 
birthday was celebrated in 1338 that one elderly Chinese official of high rank 
was nearly trampled to death.24 The chancellor's own progresses through the 
capital featured a large and impressive military escort that reportedly made 
the emperor's entourage look modest by comparison. Perhaps Bayan, his 
political aims at least superficially achieved, was beginning to grow compla-
cent and corrupt. 
But his position remained insecure. Bayan soon found he had enemies 
among a higher stratum of aristocracy than his own. Four enemies whom he 
prosecuted were princes of the blood. One of them, Chechegtii (prince of 
T'an), posted in command of troops in Mongolia, was arrested in 1338, 
brought to Ta-tu, and publicly executed outside one of the east gates. That 
was perceived as a grossly unjust act. The prince was held in popular esteem 
in the capital, and his standing was also high in Confucian circles in south 
China, because he had kept a southern scholar at his court for a time and had 
respected his advice.25 
And far down the social scale, out in the provinces of China, ominous 
commotions came to Bayan's attention. There were several small-scale millen-
arian uprisings in Honan, Kwangtung, and Kiangsi, which were quickly 
24 Yang Yii ( 1 2 8 5 - 1 3 6 1 ) , Shan chii hsin hua (TSCC ed.), p. 17a. This work has been translated by 
Herbert Franke; see his Beitrage zur Kulturgescbichte Chinas unter der Mongolenherrschaft: Das Shan-kii sin-
hua des Yang Yii (Wiesbaden, 1956). 
25 Wei Su ( 1 303 -72) , Wei T'ai-p'u chi (Wu-hsing, 1913), 8, pp. 8a~9b. 
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suppressed, but Bayan was quick to suspect that much wider conspiracies lay 
behind them. Late in 1339, a frustrated and unhappy Chinese clerk named 
Fan Meng carried out a mass murder of officials and seized Pien-liang, the 
provincial capital of Honan. He was soon caught and killed, but Bayan 
insisted that a huge Chinese conspiracy lay behind this incident, too, and 
demanded the most vigorous investigation and prosecution of everyone even 
remotely implicated, as well as a general purge of ethnic Chinese from certain 
sensitive bureaucratic positions. 
It was all too much. There were too many presumed enemies. Bayan's 
chancellorship had come to something of a dead end. The principal engineer 
of Bayan's ouster was none other than his nephew Toghto, a young man to 
whom he had accorded every kind of preferential treatment. In March 1340, 
in a very carefully arranged coup, Bayan was removed from all his offices and 
banished, first to Honan and then to the far south. He died in April on the 
way to banishment. 
T O G H T O A N D H I S O P P O S I T I O N , 1 3 4 O - I 3 5 5 
The coup against Bayan represented to some degree a revolt of a younger 
generation of Mongols against an older one, a generation more acclimatized 
to China than its predecessors had been. With the demise of Bayan, the effort 
to restore the era of Khubilai was dead as a political ideal. Political conflict 
shifted to wholly new ideological ground. 
Toghto was about twenty-six years of age and well on the way to becom-
ing the most brilliant figure of his time. He is described as having been tall 
and strong and a superior bowman. He had had ten years of grooming in 
the kesig, had served in leadership positions in the palace, and had devel-
oped impressive skills in backstairs intrigue. He had a modicum of Confu-
cian learning as well, absorbed from his southern Chinese family tutor, Wu 
Chih-fang. 
As things turned out, Toghto would have two terms as chancellor of the 
right: from 1340 to 1344 and from 1349 to 1355. As things also turned out, 
late Yiian political history at the central level came to assume a certain 
periodic rhythm, with different administrations succeeding each other, each 
using a different set of guiding ideas, on average about every five years. Thus 
after Bayan had dominated the scene from 1333 to 1340, there followed 
Toght5, from 1340 to 1344. An interlude dominated mainly by Berke 
Bukha lasted from 1344 to 1349, and this was followed by ToghtS's return to 
power, from 1349 to 1355. After 1355, the rhythm was broken, as the 
breakup of the Yiian realm was by then well under way, and the beleaguered 
central government no longer had effective political control of the country, 
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although it still remained a focus of loyalty and a source of legitimacy even in 
some of the parts of China that it no longer directly governed. 
At first glance, the study of these post-Bayan administrations seems uncon-
nected to an understanding of the imminent collapse of the dynasty, because 
none of them lacked for ideas or elan and all were willing to take on and 
remedy the major problems of the time and to make changes. Hardly effete 
and no longer reactionary, high administration after the fall of Bayan came 
into the hands of vigorous men of insight and capability. Under Toghto, the 
approach to political solutions was predominantly centralist. Under Berke 
Bukha, the approach was just the reverse — to give as wide a latitude as 
possible to provincial and local initiative. It seems highly problematical 
where responsibility for the Yuan collapse should be assigned: to the leaders 
personally, to systemic flaws, or to crisis conditions in China too overwhelm-
ing for any government to handle? 
Toghto's first administration certainly exhibited fresh new spirit. The 
young leader was quick to distinguish his regime as something wholly differ-
ent from Bayan's. A new reign title was decreed to show this. Bayan's purges 
were called off. Positions that Bayan had closed to the Chinese were reopened 
to them. Many of the great Chinese literati came back to the capital from 
voluntary retirement or from administrative exile. The examination system 
was restored. Bayan's old adherents were dismissed. Bayan himself died in 
exile only a month after his removal. 
Toghto also gave a few early signs of a new and positive direction in central 
government. He spearheaded an effort — ultimately unsuccessful for techni-
cal reasons — to provide an all-water transport route from the sea through the 
capital to the Shansi foothills.26 Following that came a project, this time 
successful, to find funds for and finish the long-stalled official histories of the 
Liao, Chin, and Sung dynasties.27 
The administration also permitted a new visibility to the emperor Toghon 
Temiir. Now nineteen, he had been allowed a minor role in the planning of 
the anti-Bayan coup. In July 1340, the young emperor issued a posthumous 
denunciation of his uncle Tugh Temiir and rid himself of his palace handlers 
and rivals. He sent his aunt Budashiri, the grand empress dowager, into exile 
and also arranged the exile, and possibly also the subsequent murder, of his 
cousin and designated successor, El Tegtis. His own infant son, Ayushiridara, 
he entrusted to Toghto's household for feeding and care. The ruler now began 
26 See John W. Dardess, Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of political change in late Yuan China (New York, 
I973)> pp. 7 9 - 8 o . 
27 On the latter, see Hok-lam Chan, "Chinese official historiography at the Yuan court: The composition 
of the Liao, Chin, and Sung histories," in China under Mongol rule, ed. John D. Langlois, J r . 
(Princeton, 1981) , pp. 56—106. 
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to appear in person to conduct Confucian state sacrifices, to listen to Confu-
cian lectures, and to host state banquets. 
In June 1344, after a series of local rebellions had broken out in widely 
scattered areas of China, the emperor accepted Toghto's unusual request to 
resign his office.28 The several short-lived administrations that followed from 
1344 and 1349 developed an agenda very different from Toghto's, for some 
compelling reasons. The cumulative effects of years of natural disasters 
throughout China, together with the continued spread of banditry and other 
signs of civil disorder, demanded that central government g i v e special atten-
tion to improving provincial and local administration so as to handle these 
problems. Mainly this required two things: ensuring the appointment of men 
of quality and ability to local positions and giving those people discretionary 
authority in handling relief and other problems - in effect, decentralizing 
national relief efforts. 
One of the principal figures of this period, Berke Bukha, had been an 
effective provincial official and had discovered at first hand (when dealing 
with the aftermath of the great Hangchow fire of 1 3 4 1 ) that one had to 
violate central regulations in order to issue relief before it was too late.2^ 
Similarly, local military garrisons needed blanket authorization in order to 
combat roving bandits. And in handling disasters or civil disturbances, local 
officials needed to dictate less and to do more to gain the cooperation of the 
local people. In 1345, the administration sent out twelve investigation 
teams, each headed jointly by a Chinese and a non-Chinese official, to visit 
every part of the realm, correct abuses, and do whatever was needed to "create 
benefits and remove harm" for the people. Also, the boundaries of some local 
jurisdictions in Honan were carefully redrawn in order to coordinate more 
efficiently the antibandit efforts.30 
Toghon Temiir was encouraged to participate in certain aspects of this new 
program. In person he exhorted newly appointed local officials to achieve 
good results, and he took part in rewarding and promoting those who had 
done outstanding work at the local level. 
Yet, far from abating under this new administrative approach, troubles 
mounted in Yiian China in the 1340s. The troubles appeared to be of such a 
nature, or on such a scale, that piecemeal initiatives by local officials, or local 
conciliation, were inadequate to deal with them. The central government 
was now also faced with chronic revenue shortfalls. Maritime gra in shipments 
28 For the details, see Dardess, Conquerors and Confucians, pp. 8 0 - 1 . 
29 Sung Lien ( 1 3 1 0 - 8 1 ) , Sung Wen-hsien kung ch'iian chi (SPPY ed.), 49, PP- 6 b - n a ; Y a n g Y i i , Shan chu 
hua> PP- 35*-36b; YS, 5 1 , p. 1 1 0 0 , and 138 , p. 3366. 
30 For the latter see SuTien-chueh ( 1 2 9 4 - 1 3 5 2 ) , Tzu hsi wen kao; repr. in vol. 3 of Yuan tai chen pen wen 
chi hut kan (Taipei, 1970), pp. i 2 a - i 5 a ; Yang Wei-chen, Tung-wei-tzu wen chi, 4 , p p . 9 b - i o b . 
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had not only seriously declined, from a peak of 3.34 million bushels in 1329 
to 2.6 million in 1342; but beginning in 1348, they continued only at the 
pleasure of a major piratical operation led by Fang Kuo-chen and his broth-
ers, whom the authorities had failed to suppress and therefore tried to concili-
ate^1 In addition to that, the Yellow River, swelled by prolonged rains, kept 
breaching its dikes and finally began shifting its course, creating widespread 
havoc and ruin.32 A different administrative strategy seemed to be in order, 
and after some complex struggles within the bureaucracy, in August 1349 
the emperor recalled Toghto to office as chancellor of the right. Radical 
solutions were now sought and implemented. 
Enthusiasm ran high among Toghto and his partisans. It reportedly was 
said at the time that 
the earlier [Yi ian} prime ministers lacked renown, and nothing in the way of ceremonial, 
literary, or institutional achievement is remembered of them. But [Toghto] wants to under-
take great acts and dazzle the world; he wants to surpass the old methods of the ancestors, and 
leave behind an immortal name in the historical records.33 
It may be argued that these words accurately capture the euphoria of the 
moment. Surely none of what followed would even have been attempted 
without there having been a powerful belief in government circles that all 
crises were soluble, that the world could be remade overnight on orders from 
the top. 
All of Toght5's new plans entailed central direction and control.34 New 
ideas from below were welcomed, but once accepted, it was the central 
government that implemented them. Regional or local initiative was now 
heavily restricted. 
To take Toghto's major projects in their chronological order, the first 
answered the need to find more revenue immediately. It was not thought 
feasible to try to increase rates on the traditional tax sources (land, salt, 
commerce, etc.), most of which were continuing to shrink. Consequently the 
decision was taken late in 1350 to print a new issue of (inadequately backed) 
paper currency — two million ingots' worth in the first run in 1 3 5 1 - and to 
circulate it by way of government payments for materials and labor.35 
31 See Dardess, Conquerors and Confucians, pp. 88-9. 
32 See ibid., p. 87. 
33 Ch'iian Heng (fl. 14th c.), Keng sben u>ai shih; repr. as vol. 3 of Shih liao ts'ung pien (Taipei, 1968), pp. 
I9a-b. This translation differs slightly from both that in Dardess, Conquerors and Confucians, pp. 96— 
97, and that in Helmut Schulte-Uffelage, trans, and ed., Das Keng-shen wai-shih: Eine Quelle zur spdten 
Mongolenzeit (Berlin, 1963), p. 56. 
34 For a detailed account of Toghto's second regime, see Dardess, Conquerors and Confucians, pp. 95—118. 
35 Yiian money is the subject of a large bibliography. The standard Western-language authority is still 
Herbert Franke's Geld und Wirtschaft in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft. A recent contribution is 
Nancy S. Steinhardt's "Currency issues of Yuan China," Bulletin of Sung and Yiian Studies, 16 (1980), 
pp. 5 9 - 8 1 . 
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Following the instant solution of the financial question, the government 
next announced, in April 1 35 1 , its plan to tame the Yellow River, by 
rechanneling it along its lower course, so that it would again flow into the sea 
south of the Shantung peninsula. There was much opposition to this idea, 
and Toghto and his people were well aware that nothing like it had ever been 
done before. Yet, funded by the new currency issue, the Yellow River-
rerouting project was begun in May and was brought to a successful conclu-
sion in December of the same year, 1 35 1 ; 170,000 troops and civilian 
workers took part in the work. An official commemorative inscription by 
Ou-yang Hsiian celebrates this triumph of hydraulic engineering in great 
technical detail.36 
Meanwhile, in the summer of 1 35 1 , there broke out in the Huai valley 
region, at some distance from the river project, first one, then another, and 
then still another popular uprising in what rapidly spread to become a 
nationwide social explosion of extraordinary proportions, as bandits, reli-
gious sectarians, and other dissidents ran amok, moving from place to place 
capturing administrative cities, pillaging stores, killing officials, and set-
tling local scores. These rebellions are described at great length elsewhere.37 
Suffice it to relate here that far from reeling in shock from this catastrophic 
outbreak of disorder, Toghto and his people acknowledged it, quickly ac-
cepted the challenge of dealing with it, and over the next three years (by 
1354) definitely gained the upper hand. In a sense, central authority came to 
view national pacification as one more large-scale problem that it was already 
equipped and competent to deal with. 
It has been asserted that owing to corruption, mismanagement, and the 
like, the regular Yiian armies had grown too decadent to defend the dynasty 
from these upheavals.38 There may be much truth in this assertion, but the 
fact remains that no matter what their condition or state of training, there 
were never at any time enough regular Yiian troops to handle the nationwide 
breakdown of order that set China aflame in the early 1350s. Some Mongo-
lian units were undisciplined and poorly prepared at the outset, but if they 
lost some early encounters with the insurrectionary forces, they soon won a 
good many more. Yiian military units of every description and national 
origin were pressed into service, and especially in south China, local defense 
militias, Chinese armies recruited for the occasion, played a major part in 
36 YS, 66, pp. 1646-54. This remains untranslated, as far as I know, but is briefly discussed in Joseph 
Needham et aL, Science and civilization in China, vol. 4, Physics and physical technology, pt. 3, Civil 
engineering and nautics (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 325, 344; and Yang Lien-sheng, Excursions in sinology 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 222—3. 
37 See the chapters by Frederick W. Mote and Edward L. Dreyer in F. W. Mote and D. C. Twitchett, 
eds., The Ming dynasty, 1368-1644, pt. 1, vol. 7 of The Cambridge history of China (Cambridge, 1988). 
38 For example, Hsiao, The military establishment of the Yiian dynasty, p. 63. 
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turning back the rebel tide. The rebellions could not have been handled 
otherwise.39 
It is remarkable that Toght5 managed not only to create a nationwide 
apparatus of pacification but also to keep effective control over it. By always 
assembling and disassembling the larger military groups, by constantly trans-
ferring commanders from place to place, by not allowing the heads of any 
single government agency or princely establishment to dominate any major 
operation, and by carefully keeping supply organizationally distinct from 
other military operations, Toghto was able to prevent a downward slippage of 
military power into regional hands and to prevent military commanders from 
establishing provincial power bases. The largest, or at least the symbolically 
most important, campaigns Toghto chose to command in person: He led a 
successful expedition in 1 352 to recapture Hsii-chou (in present-day north-
west Kiangsu Province), an especially critical administrative center, and to 
restore order in the Huai valley area. 
While all these military operations were going on, the maritime grain 
shipments from south China were ended. Rather than negotiate with the 
pirate Fang Kuo-chen, who was still active, with a view to resuming the 
shipments to the capital, Toghto decided instead to make a rice basket of 
the greater metropolitan area itself. This decision was consistent with Togh-
t5's whole centralist approach to administration. It was a colossal and ex-
tremely costly undertaking, being allocated five million ingots in new paper 
currency - two and a half times more than the cost of rerouting the Yellow 
River. 
North China was unusually wet in the Yiian period, and earlier trials had 
shown that rice could indeed be grown there. In 1 353 , a supervisory branch 
office of agriculture {fen ssu nung ssu) was set up there, which recruited two 
thousand dike builders and paddy farmers from the south for a year's paid 
service as technical advisers to the native farmers, who were unfamiliar with 
rice cultivation, and other farmers were brought in from Shantung to aug-
ment the local population. Other state farm systems were established in 
Honan Province and in southern Manchuria. It is not wholly clear how 
successful these new state-run farms actually became, because of Toghto's 
imminent political downfall and the continuation of the civil wars, but as a 
bold plan to revolutionize north China's age-old farming traditions over-
night, it is an example of Toght5's vision of the limitless possibilities of 
inspired government. 
Late in 1354, Toghto took personal command of a second grand military 
expedition, this time against the city of Kao-yu (just north ofYang-chou, on 
39 Details are given in Dardess, Conquerors and Confucians, pp. 104 ff. 
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the Grand Canal), which was occupied by a former salt smuggler, Chang 
Shih-ch'eng. This expedition, as it turned out, was Toghto's last official act. 
Had the siege of Kao-yu in fact forced Chang Shih-ch'eng's surrender, which 
was all but inevitable, the back of the nationwide rebellions would have been 
resoundingly broken. Even as it was, those rebels still active had been chased 
into hiding or were barely surviving. But while the siege was still in prog-
ress, ijn a stunning act of mis judgment and bad political timing, Toghon 
Temiir suddenly issued ToghtS an order of dismissal and banishment. 
Toghto, unfortunately for the dynasty, obeyed. The siege thereupon disinte-
grated. The Yiian lost the military and political initiative. The rebellions, all 
but quashed, took on a new form and new life. It is from this crucible that 
the successor dynasty, the Ming, emerged and thirteen years later reunified 
China. 
Why was Toghtd dismissed? There seem to be several considerations, 
probably one of which was a well-established five-year cycle of administrative 
turnover. Over a period of five years or so, corruption, favoritism, and 
personal ill feelings seem to have reached a critical point within each succes-
sive late Yiian ruling faction; this was certainly the case in Toght5's circle, in 
that it was Khama, one of his own disaffected adherents, who took a leading 
role in the palace intrigues that led to his downfall. Moreover, Toghto's 
ambitious programs had pretty much run their course and achieved their 
purposes. The Yellow River was tamed, and the various insurrectionary 
movements were all but destroyed. There was nothing left of Toghto's na-
tional agenda but details. It was time for a change. 
In this connection, one must reckon with those in government opposed to 
Toghto not so much on personal grounds but because they held different 
beliefs about the appropriate goals and operating procedures of government. 
Toghto's ambitious activism demanded discipline and centralization. The 
Censorate was held in check; provincial and local officials were given very 
little initiative; and military commanders were given the least possible free-
dom of action. There is clear evidence that at least some of the officials who 
had served the administrations of 1344—9 disliked Toghto's tight controls 
and resented the protection he gave his own loyal partisans. These men now 
demanded a return of the decentralized mode of governance and a greater 
scope for the institutional, regional, and personal initiative that characterized 
it. This philosophical conflict reminded some contemporaries of the struggle 
between the reform and conservative factions in the late Northern Sung. 
Toghon Temiir also had his own reasons for removing Toghto, who, like 
his uncle Bayan before him, had grown very powerful. Perhaps inadvertently, 
he had shown this power to the emperor by delaying his agreement to the 
formal investiture of Ayushiridara as heir apparent. Toghon Temiir was an-
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gered and upset. What was it that had poisoned relationships between the 
chancellor and the imperial house? 
By all the signs, Toghon Temiir, now thirty-four years of age, had with-
drawn into a kind of semiretirement.40 He was regularly participating with a 
select circle of adepts, and an all-female dance ensemble and orchestra, in the 
sexual rituals of Tibetan Buddhism. On at least one occasion, he sponsored a 
holy circumambulation of the imperial palace grounds by a group of 108 
monks. He was also having built a huge pleasure boat (the model for it was of 
his own making) for sailing on the lake in the imperial palace, and he himself 
also had a major hand in the design and fashioning of a large, technically 
elaborate clepsydra, or water clock.41 Perhaps in order to accommodate the 
new boat, a costly project was later undertaken to dredge the palace waterways. 
Meanwhile, Toghon Temiir authorized a series of steps to allow his oldest 
son, Ayushiridara, to learn about and assume some responsibilities for govern-
ment. In 1354 Ayushiridara was about fifteen years old. At the age of nine he 
had been ordered to learn Uighur writing (Wei-wu-erh wen tzu), and at the 
age of ten, Chinese. Shortly after this, in 1349, with elaborate and solemn 
ceremony, a special Chinese-style academy was set up in the palace for 
Ayushiridara, with a tutorial staff of nine men. A senior tutor, Li Hao-wen, 
compiled four textbooks on Chinese subjects especially for his young pupil. 
Four years later a Household Administration for the heir apparent (Chan-
shih yiian) was established, with a staff of no fewer than eighty-three officials 
and clerks. Other, independent offices for the heir apparent controlled a 
ceremonial guard plus two regular guard units, and in addition there were 
assigned to Ayushiridara 250 housemen (ayimagh kesigden) of his own. The 
housemen received 27,500 ingots in cash grants, and Ayushiridara's consort, 
100,000 more. An unused palace was selected and repaired for Ayushiridara 
to live in. He was given the privilege of appointing his own officials, and late 
in 1354 (while Toghto was out on campaign) he was given the power of 
review (ch'i) over all official business sent up to his father, the emperor. In 
sum, Toghon Temiir created by degrees a new, large, and costly center of 
political influence within the palace, headed by his designated heir. All that 
remained was to conduct the final official ceremonies of Ayushiridara's instal-
lation as heir apparent. 
The obvious inference is that Toghto delayed those ceremonies because he 
considered the rise of Ayushiridara a threat to himself. Yet Ayushiridara and 
Toghto were actually very close. Ayushiridara's childhood was spent in 
40 In one view, the emperor's interest in government peaked daring Toghto's first incumbency (1341—4). 
See Fujishima Tateki, "Gen no Juntei to sono jidai," Otani gakuho, 49 (1970), pp. 50-65 . 
41 Joseph Needham et al., Heavenly clockwork: The great astronomical clocks of medieval China, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge, 1986), p. 140. 
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Toghto's house, and when at age ten he was given his earliest tuition in Chinese 
books (the Hsiao ching), his instructor was Toghto's family tutor, Cheng 
Shen.42 Moreover, Toghto personally contributed 122,000 ingots toward the 
building of a Buddhist temple outside one of the north gates of Ta-tu, so that 
prayers might continually be offered for Ayushiridara's well-being. 
Another possible reason for the delay may have been that because Ayushi-
ridara was not a son by a principal consort, Toghto considered him unquali-
fied. Ayushiridara's mother was a former palace maid and tea server of 
Korean nationality, of whom Toghon Temiir was very fond. He had made 
her second empress (ti erh huang bou) in 1340, an act that many people had 
opposed, in view of the low place that the Mongols had assigned to the 
Koreans as a race and the effect of her new status on the complex issue of 
Yiian relations with Korea.43 Toghon Temiir's principal empress, a self-
effacing Mongolian woman, bore only one male child, who died in infancy. 
The dates of his short life are not known, but if he were alive in 1353—4, 
then Toghto's hesitancy on the investiture question becomes understand-
able. But all this is speculation: Toghto may simply have been too busy 
dealing with the empire's crises to schedule the event. All that really 
matters is that the emperor suspected the delay to have been deliberate. In 
April 1355, after Toghto's removal, the solemn investiture ceremony was at 
last carried out. 
T H E D I S I N T E G R A T I O N O F T H E Y U A N 
The emperor may have considered the dismissal of Toghto a fairly routine 
measure, something he had done on a number of occasions in the past, 
without the integrity of the dynasty having been compromised as a result. 
But the dismissal of Toghto in fact put an end to the Yiian as an integrated 
political system, largely for the reason that unlike the period of decentraliza-
tion from 1344 to 1349, various new military and administrative structures 
had been created in many parts of China in response to the insurrections after 
1 35 1 that had both the manpower and resources to act independently and 
soon did so. Official appointments at the regional level and below could no 
longer be made by the authorities in Ta-tu as a matter of central bureaucratic 
prerogative, as had normally been the case earlier. The provinces of China fell 
into the hands of autonomous regional figures (warlords is perhaps the right 
word), some of whom had earlier been rebels and others commanders of 
antirebel forces. From 1355 to 1368, Yiian central government did the best 
42 Sung Lien, Sung Wen-hsien kung ch'iian chi, 49, pp. 6b— 1 1a . 
43 For the Korean side of this story, see Hsiao, Yiian tai shih hsin t'an, pp. 231—62. 
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it could to retain at least the token loyalty of its self-supporting commanders 
in the field and to negotiate diplomatically the nominal surrender of former 
rebels, men like Fang Kuo-chen and Chang Shih-ch'eng. Meanwhile, the 
leaders of other rebel movements (e.g., Ch'en Yu-liang and Chu Yiian-chang) 
emerged after Toghto's downfall to build new and stronger regional govern-
ments and, on the whole, to maintain consistently hostile attitudes toward 
the Yiian. Thus the Yiian central government itself became in many respects 
no more than a regional government, controlling in China only the capital 
and its outlying areas, although it retained to the end a residual legitimacy as 
the government of all of China (see Chapter 9). 
The most significant development of Toghon Temiir's last years in China 
(1355—68) was the rise of the Ming dynastic movement based in Nanking 
and, in particular, the alliance it struck in 1360 with the leaders of what was 
in fact a fundamentalist, Confucian moral—political revolution. This revolu-
tion took shape in the general conditions of late Yiian rule, in the insurrec-
tions of 1 3 5 1 to 1354, and in the dynastic disintegration that followed 
Toghto's dismissal. 
The problem of the origin of this moral revolution deserves more than the 
few paragraphs available here, because it involves such subtle filaments as the 
history of society and family, taxation and resource mobilization, legal his-
tory, and the development of Confucian thought.44 Suffice it to say that this 
revolution gathered its force at the grass roots, principally in southeast 
China. One early manifestation of it can be traced to 1342 and the successful 
demonstration of a pilot project in tax and service reform in Shao-hsing 
Prefecture, a negligible producer of revenue. 
But in this small crack in the giant structure, as it were, Confucian-
minded activists in both office and private life effected in the face of many 
obstacles an equitable reapportionment of fiscal obligations, by combining 
the reform with a campaign of moral reawakening. The local community was 
deliberately polarized into good and evil through the revival of the ancient 
village drinking ceremony (hsiang yin chiu li), in which the selfish and recalci-
trant were publicly exposed and disgraced and the virtuous were honored. 
This project was repeated in 1350 in Chin-hua and Ch'u-chou prefectures; 
here Yii Ch'iieh, the Tangut encountered earlier on the non-Chinese portion 
of the chin-shih list of 1 333 , was a guiding official hand. Again, the work was 
exhausting; the revenue benefit to the Yiian government was almost nil; and 
44 Recent work in this direction includes Paul Heng-chao Chen, Chinese legal tradition under the Mongols: 
The code of 1291 as reconstructed (Princeton, 1979); Jennifer Holmgren, "Observations on marriage and 
inheritance practices in early Mongol and Yiian society with particular reference to the levirate," 
Journal of Asian History, 20 (1986), pp. 127—92; and John D. Langlois, J r . , "Political thought in 
Chin-hua under Mongol rule," in China under Mongol rule, ed. John D. Langlois, Jr. (Princeton, 
1981), pp. 1 3 7 - 8 5 . 
5 8 2 S H U N - T I A N D T H E E N D OF Y U A N R U L E IN C H I N A 
the effort was made at so low a level in the official administrative hierarchy 
(and so irrelevant to the thrust of Toght5's central planning) that it quite 
escaped the notice of the court. However, it was celebrated as a great moral 
triumph in local Confucian writings, and these radiated disproportionately 
wide influences. If the Yiian authorities in Ta-tu took little note of these 
influences, the Ming founders soon would.45 
It is also in the writings of local Confucians that one discovers "public" 
reactions to the mass insurrections and the breakdown of Yiian central author-
ity after 1355. There was a general consensus that the insurrections were an 
inevitable popular response to the size, cost, and corruption of the Yiian 
government and to the heavy and iniquitous revenue demands that this 
produced. To remedy these abuses it was generally agreed that the costs of 
government must be cut severely and that all corruption be resolutely purged 
from bureaucracy. (The Yiian state was never in a position to proceed very far 
along these lines, and eventually it was the Ming state that made frugality a 
guiding policy.) 
As to the regionalization of Yiian rule after 1355, Confucian opinion was 
divided, and there was indeed a dilemma in it. Some contemporary Confu-
cian writers argued that the appointment of autonomous regional warlords 
like Fang Kuo-chen or Chang Shih-ch'eng as Yiian provincial officials was 
congruent with the ancient Chou pattern of "feudal" decentralization and 
hence legitimate, provided that the regional leaders obeyed the court and 
conducted themselves in accordance with the strictest ethical standards. It 
was believed they would do this if the Confucians could exert enough moral 
pressure on them. This line of argument was totally unrealistic, but it 
promised a reduction of armed conflict and was attractive enough to help 
keep Yiian loyalism alive in many parts of south China into the 1360s. 
A small but powerful minority of Confucians argued the opposite, and this 
was a voice of moral revolution. In their view, regionalization was no good at 
all; it simply masked the perpetuation of the iniquity, the acquisitiveness, 
the self-aggrandizement, and the chronic favoritism and corruption that had 
brought the Yiian to its present sorry state in the first place. A dynasty that 
rewarded criminals with the highest of its offices and honors must forfeit all 
claim to the moral leadership of society. 
One of the most forceful and articulate partisans of this line was Liu Chi, 
the thirty-eighth name (of fifty) on the Chinese part of the chin shih list of 
1333 . Liu Chi had held several low-ranking local and provincial posts 
through the early 1350s, in which he had ample opportunity to nourish his 
45 John W. Dardess, "Confucianism, local reform, and centralization in late Yiian Chekiang, 1 3 4 2 - 5 9 , " 
in Yiian thought: Chinese thought and religion under the Mongols, ed. Hok-lam Chan and Wm. Theodore 
de Bary (New York, 1982), pp. 327-74. 
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outrage at the malfeasance and cover-ups in which he found many of his 
official superiors engaging. He was early on so implacable an enemy of Fang 
Kuo-chen that on one occasion he was imprisoned after the court decided, in 
the interest of preserving the peace, to try to accommodate the pirate rather 
than suppress him. Later, in 1356, Liu was appointed to the modest post of 
registrar in the Chiang-Che Branch Bureau of Military Affairs that had just 
been established in Hangchow (one of many examples of the proliferation of 
Yiian bureaucracy in the crisis years of the 1350s). As registrar, Liu Chi was 
at once sent to inland Chekiang, where a superior, Shih-mo I-sun, administra-
tive assistant in the same agency, had charge of several prefectures. What 
follows is a singular and crucial episode in late Yiian history. 
It is important to try to reconstruct this scene because of its direct implica-
tions for the future of China. Far away in Ta-tu, the Yiian central govern-
ment coped as best it could with a very confused national situation. Provin-
cial officials now enjoyed plenipotentiary powers. As of March 1356, all 
ethnic qualifications were dropped for local official appointees. Rebels aban-
doned the war-wrecked Huai region of central China to set up base areas 
elsewhere: Chu Yiian-chang, leading what was still to some extent a religious 
sectarian movement, crossed the Yangtze River and took Nanking; Chang 
Shih-ch'eng, saved at Kao-yu by the emperor's cashiering of Toghto, came 
south and took Soochow. The Chiang-Che provincial governor Dash Temiir, a 
Confucian-trained Khangli aristocrat, desperate for expedients, tried setting 
the warlords against one another, cooperating first with one and then with 
another. In 1356 he induced Fang Kuo-chen to help in a fight against Chang 
Shih-ch'eng. The Chiang-nan Branch Censorate liked this strategy. But the 
Chiang-Che Branch Bureau of Military Affairs resolutely opposed it, in part 
because the governor himself had regularly appointed to that body men who 
hated Fang Kuo-chen. Each agency had its own army. In addition, there 
existed independent militia forces, which compounded the confusion by their 
penchant for unpredictably switching sides. This is how badly fragmented 
Yiian authority had become by 1356. 
Liu Chi and Shih-mo I-sun and their colleagues occupied one small splin-
ter near the bottom of this shattering system; yet it was they, and they alone, 
who possessed the clarity of moral vision to advertise openly their thought 
and action in the provincial interior as the only possible working model of 
the kind of effort needed to bring about a true and lasting restoration of 
Yiian rule in China. In the provincial interior, good and evil completely 
disentangled themselves and migrated to the opposite ends of an almost 
Manichaean polarity. All good was altruistic and centralizing. All evil was 
self-interested and particularistic or regionalizing. One would achieve local 
pacification by placing all resources and leadership at the head of the forces 
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of good and directing them passionately and relentlessly against the forces of 
evil (i.e., landlords and "bandits" believed to be in league with Fang Kuo-
chen). Shih-mo I-sun was infinitely more than an administrative assistant in 
the Branch Bureau of Military Affairs in an obscure corner of southeast 
China. He was, according to Liu Chi, a world-saving hero whose true 
destiny was to rectify and restore the Yiian dynasty, just as two thousand 
years earlier, Duke Huan of Ch'i had rescued the failing Chou. 
In 1357, the Yiian court agreed to give minor promotions to Shih-mo 
I-sun and Liu Chi and their circle, but it refused to raise them to a more 
influential level in the Yiian bureaucracy. The policy of regionalization would 
continue. Liu Chi thereupon resigned in despair and, as did several other 
Confucian theoreticians from the provincial interior at this time, wrote out 
his thoughts on morals and politics. In 1360, these ideologues joined the 
future Ming founder, Chu Yuan-chang, who had just invaded their territory. 
And so it was the first Ming emperor, rather than Toghon Temiir, who made 
effective use of the techniques of tax equalization and popular mobilization 
that had been recognized in Chiang-Che Province since 1342, who adopted 
the cause of moral absolutism the Yiian had refused in 1357, and who 
eventually fastened upon China a centralization of an unprecedentedly harsh 
kind.46 
C O N C L U S I O N : W H Y D I D T H E Y 0 A N D Y N A S T Y F A L L ? 
For some years after its retreat to the steppe in 1368, the Yiian court 
maintained its claim to China, but it never seems to have gone beyond self-
serving fantasy to make any sober-minded effort to understand the reasons for 
the catastrophic collapse of its rule there. By contrast, that collapse was so 
fresh and vivid in the minds of the Ming founders that to an appreciable 
extent, they explicitly fashioned the Ming to counteract what they seriously 
thought to have been the causes of the Yiian breakdown. Put simply, their 
prescription was that if bureaucracy were cut in size and unflinchingly 
purged of any sign of selfish and corrupt behavior, and if the emperor himself 
took direct charge of things and acted without fear or favor (as Toghdn Temiir 
had most lamentably failed to do), the ruling system would truly reinforce 
fundamental Confucian moral principles, and a millennium of peace and 
plenty would ensue. 
Were these Ming policies based on a correct or fair assessment of the 
Yiian's shortcomings? Did the Yiian collapse because Toghon Temiir ne-
46 John W. Dardess, Confucianism and autocracy: Professional elites in the founding of the Ming dynasty 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983). 
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glected his duties, allowing factional struggle in the bureaucracy to intensify 
and corruption to grow unchecked? Perhaps. At least, it does seem possible 
to interpret broadly the events of the 1350s and 1360s as an example of what 
may happen when a large, privileged ruling elite is faced with worsening 
deficits in its national resource base: A division of the realm into autonomous 
parts does afford regional elites closer access to resources. 
It would be hard indeed to build a persuasive case on behalf of Toghon 
Temiir's ability to provide inspiring leadership. Toghto tackled energetically 
the problem of maintaining continued central control over national resources 
and personnel, in part, of course, through the desperate expedient of printing 
more and more unbacked paper money, an inflationary measure that could 
not have continued indefinitely (in fact, paper money had already become 
worthless and ceased to circulate in 1356). It might be argued that the 
integrity of the Yiian realm was sustained as long as it was only by the 
extraordinary personal talents of Toghto and that, inopportune as his dis-
missal may have been, centralized Yiian rule would have not long survived 
him anyway. The lessons that the Ming founders drew from the chaotic 
events of the late Yiian did have some rational basis. 
But it may be worth recalling that the fourteenth century was calamitous 
everywhere. Within and beyond the various Mongol empires, from Iceland 
and England at one end of Eurasia to Japan at the other, societies were 
suffering plagues, famines, agricultural decline, depopulation, and civil up-
heaval. Few societies were spared at least some of the symptoms. China was 
spared none of them. No fewer than thirty-six years in the fourteenth century 
had exceptionally severe winters, more than in any other century on record.47 
In the greater Yellow River region, major floods and droughts seem to have 
occurred with unprecedented frequency in the fourteenth century.48 Serious 
epidemics broke out in the 1340s and 1350s.49 Famines were recorded for 
almost every year of Toghdn Temiir's reign, leading to great mortality and 
costing the government vast sums in relief.50 These natural disasters created 
huge numbers of uprooted and impoverished people, fodder for the revolts 
that wracked the realm in the 1350s. 
The various late Yiian regimes all tried seriously to alleviate these disas-
ters. None ignored them. Yiian medical and food relief efforts, by all appear-
ances, were both conscientious and sophisticated. Indeed, the history of 
Toghon Temiir's reign raises the question whether any regime could have 
47 See H. H. Lamb, Climate: Present, past and future (London, 1977), vol. 2, p. 447. For details on the 
extremely severe cold during Toghon Temiir's reign, see YS, 51 , pp. 1097-8. 
48 Chao Kang, Man and land in Chinese history: An economic analysis (Stanford, 1986), p. 203. 
49 YS, 5 1 , p. h i 1. 
50 YS, 5 1 , pp. 1 1 0 9 - 1 0 . 
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coped with these repeated large-scale disasters any better than the Yiian did. 
It might well be the case that the long-term cumulative effects of such 
repeated natural calamities were too great for any government to handle and 
that if normal conditions had prevailed in China, the Yiian dynasty might 
have lasted much longer than it did. 
The principal factors and the chains of causation in the fall of the Yiian 
will certainly be studied and debated for a long time to come. Yet we should 
recollect that the Yiian was not in any direct sense a victim of the blind forces 
of history. In 1368 it was forcibly driven out of China by a consciously 
extremist, morally revolutionary movement that, by the most diligent ef-
forts, through sheer determination and hard struggle, took every advantage 
of the palpable weaknesses of the Yiian government of the 1350s and 1360s 
to impose its own vision of peace and order on China. The Yiian government 
itself had been given an opportunity to endorse that same vision, and it had 
understandably declined it. In the direct sense, the Yiian fell at last because 
the Ming founders willed it. 
